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Abstract 
 
Climate change is already a systemic risk to the global economy. While there is a large body of 
literature documenting economic consequences, there is scarce research on the link between 
climate change and sovereign risk. This paper investigates the impact of climate change 
vulnerability and resilience on sovereign bond yields and spreads in 98 countries over the 
period 1995–2017. We find that the vulnerability and resilience to climate change have a 
significant impact on the cost government borrowing, after controlling for conventional 
determinants of sovereign risk. That is, countries that are more resilient to climate change have 
lower bond yields and spreads relative to countries with greater vulnerability to climate change. 
Furthermore, partitioning the sample into country groups reveals that the magnitude and 
statistical significance of these effects are much greater in developing countries with weaker 
capacity to adapt to and mitigate the consequences of climate change. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Climate change already poses a systemic risk to the global economy. With the global average 
surface temperature rising by 1.1 degrees Celsius since 1880, the frequency and severity of climate 
shocks—ranging from heatwaves and droughts to hurricanes and coastal flooding—have 
intensified across the world (Figure 1). Looking ahead, extreme weather events are projected to 
worsen as the global annual mean temperatures increase by as much as 4 degrees Celsius over the 
next century (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2014).1 The socioeconomic consequences of climate 
change will be felt across the world, but potential vulnerability to weather anomalies depends on 
the size and composition of economies, the resilience of institutions and physical infrastructure, 
and the capacity for adaption and mitigation.   
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
There is a large body of literature documenting significant negative effects of climate-related shifts 
in the physical environment on economic growth (Gallup et al., 1999; Nordhaus, 2006; Dell et al., 
2012), but research on the link between climate change and sovereign risk remains scarce and it is 
not clear whether financial markets efficiently price climate-related risks. Accordingly, this paper 
contributes to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of how vulnerability and 
resilience to climate change affect the cost of sovereign borrowing in 98 advanced and developing 
countries over the period 1995–2017.2 We extend the conventional determinants of government 
bond yields and spreads to empirically investigate the impact of climate change on the pricing of 
sovereign risk across countries and over time, taking advantage of a new dataset of climate change 
vulnerability and resilience developed by the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Institute (ND-GAIN). 
We employ alternative estimation methodologies and taking into account conventional 
macroeconomic factors. The results show that climate change vulnerability has a statistically and 
economically significant impact on government bond yields and spreads, after controlling for 
conventional macroeconomic and institutional determinants of sovereign risk. We also find that 
climate change resilience has a similarly significant dampening effect on the cost of government 
borrowing. That is, countries that are more resilient to climate change have lower bond yields and 
spreads relative to countries with greater vulnerability to risks associated with climate change. 
Furthermore, partitioning the sample into country groups reveals that the magnitude and statistical 
significance of these effects are much greater in developing countries with weaker capacity to 
                                                 
1 Climate refers to a distribution of weather outcomes for a given location, and climate change describes 
environmental shifts in the distribution of weather outcomes toward extremes.  
2 In this paper, we focus on countries’ exposure to physical risks associated with climate change, but it should be 
noted that transition risks related to climate change, such as stranded asset exposures in the financial system, can 
also amount to a sizable burden. 
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adapt to and mitigate the consequences of climate change. These findings remain robust to a 
battery of sensitivity checks, including alternative measures of bond spreads and yields, empirical 
specifications, and estimation methodologies. The key policy takeaway from this paper is that while 
climate change is inevitable, policymakers can still enhance resilience to absorb shocks to 
economic activity and manage public finances better.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the related 
literature. Section III describes the data used in the analysis. Section IV introduces the salient 
features of our econometric strategy. Section V presents the empirical results, including a series of 
robustness checks. Finally, Section VI offers concluding remarks with policy implications.  
 
II.   A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This paper draws from two major threads of the literature—determinants of sovereign bond yields 
and spreads and the macroeconomic impact of climate change. First, most studies find empirical 
support to the theoretical prediction that the level and composition of government debt and other 
macroeconomic factors have an impact on government bond yields and spreads (Engen and 
Hubbard, 2004; Kinoshita, 2006; Ardagna et al., 2007; Laubach, 2009; Hischer and Nosbusch, 2010; 
Gómez-Puig et al., 2014). More specifically, the economics literature suggests that government’s 
borrowing costs depend on macroeconomic fundamentals and institutional factors (Attinasi and 
others, 2009; Afonso 2010; Poghosyan, 2012; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Afonso and Nunes, 2015; 
Godl and Kleinert, 2016; de Grauwe et al., 2017; Jalles, 2019).3 
Second, there is a growing literature on the economic and financial effects of climate-related shifts 
in the physical environment.4 Starting with Nordhaus (1991; 1992) and Cline (1992), aggregate 
damage functions have become a mainstay of analyzing the climate-economy nexus. Although 
identifying the macroeconomic impact of annual variation in climatic conditions remains a 
challenging empirical task, Gallup et al. (1999), Nordhaus (2006) and Dell et al. (2012) find that 
higher temperatures result in a significant reduction in economic growth in developing countries. 
Burke et al. (2015) confirm this finding and conclude that an increase in temperature would have 
a greater damage in countries that are concentrated in geographic areas with hotter climates. 
Using expanded datasets, Acevedo et al. (2018), Burke and Tanutama (2019) and Kahn et al. (2019) 
show that the long-term macroeconomic impact of weather anomalies is uneven across countries 
and that economic growth responds nonlinearly to temperature. In a related vein, it is widely 
documented that climate change by increasing the frequency and severity of natural disasters 
affects economic development (Loyaza et al., 2012; Noy, 2009; Raddatz, 2009; Skidmore and Toya, 
                                                 
3 For example, as governments debt rises, sovereign bond yields should go up in recognition of the higher risk 
(default, monetization-driven depreciation and inflation) carried by investors holding government securities. The 
successful elimination of fears of a looming Eurozone break-up following the Global Financial Crisis, can be partly 
attributed to improvements in economic fundamentals (Muellbauer, 2014). 
4 Tol (2018) provides a recent overview of this expanding literature. 
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2002; Rasmussen, 2004), reduces the accumulation of human capital (Cuaresma, 2010) and worsens 
a country´s trade balance (Gassebner et al., 2010).  
There is, however, scarce research in terms quantity and intensity on how risks associated with 
climate change are priced in financial markets. Bansal et al. (2016) and IMF (2020) find that the risk 
of climate change—as proxied by temperature rises—has a negative effect on asset valuations, 
while Bernstein et al. (2019) show that real estate exposed to the physical risk of sea level rise sell 
at a discount relative to otherwise similar unexposed properties. Similarly, focusing on the US, 
Painter (2019) find that counties more likely to be affected by climate change pay more in 
underwriting fees and initial yields to issue long-term municipal bonds compared to counties 
unlikely to be affected by climate change. Our paper is most closely related to Kling et al. (2018) 
that find higher exposure to climate vulnerability, as measured by the ND-GAIN index, results in a 
higher cost of borrowing in a group of 20 low-income countries, which may yield irregular 
estimates due to the idiosyncrasy of sovereign debt in low-income countries. To avoid the sample 
selection bias and potential endogeneity concerns, we broaden the sample of countries and 
employ alternative specifications and estimation methodologies.    
 
III.   DATA OVERVIEW 
We use several sources to construct a panel dataset of annual observations covering 98 advanced 
and developing countries over the period 1995–2017.5  Economic and financial statistics are 
assembled from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) databases, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Our 
dependent variables are government bond yields and spreads as measured by 10-year foreign-
currency-denominated government bond yields and spreads vis-à-vis the U.S. benchmark, which 
are drawn from Bloomberg. We also use sovereign bond spreads on external U.S. dollar-
denominated debt using data from J.P. Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) as 
alternative measure to broaden the coverage of emerging market economies and developing 
countries and check the robustness of our baseline results.  
                                                 
5 The full list of countries covered in the analysis includes Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Australia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, 
France, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Senegal, 
Serbia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zambia. However, bond data drawn from Bloomberg and J.P Morgan EMBIG 
cover different sets of countries—54 advanced and developing countries in the case of Bloomberg and 44 
emerging market economies in the case of EMBIG. 
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The main explanatory variables of interest are vulnerability and resilience to climate change as 
measured by the ND-GAIN indices, which capture a country’s overall susceptibility to climate-
related disruptions and capacity to deal with the consequences of climate change, respectively.6 
The composite indices are based on 45 indicators, of which 36 variables contributing to the 
vulnerability score and 9 variables constituting the resilience score. Vulnerability refers to “a 
country’s exposure, sensitivity, and capacity to adapt to the impacts of climate change” and 
comprise indicators of six life-supporting sectors—food, water, health, ecosystem services, human 
habitat and infrastructure. Resilience, on the other hand, assesses “a country’s capacity to apply 
economic investments and convert them to adaptation actions” and covers three areas—
economic, governance and social readiness—with nine indicators.7  
Figure 2 shows the time profile and box-whisker plots for both the vulnerability and resilience 
indices for the entire sample and income group, respectively. It also presents in the bottom panel 
the scatter plot showing unconditional correlations between these climate change indices and 
sovereign bonds. We can observe that resilience to climate change shocks has been increasing, 
particularly since the early 2000s. It is also clear from the data that advanced economies are much 
less vulnerable to climate change than developing countries. The bottom panel of Figure 2 hints 
to the positive (negative) bivariate relationship between the vulnerability (resilience) index and 
sovereign bond spreads (an aspect that will be properly analyzed—econometrically speaking—in 
the following section). Finally, it is important to highlight that the time-series variation in the ND-
GAIN indices reflect the changes in countries’ levels of vulnerability and readiness (which are not 
necessarily forward looking), not from the changes in the projected vulnerability and readiness to 
physical risks associated with climate change. 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Following the empirical literature, we introduce a set of control variables, including the level and 
growth rate of real GDP, consumer price inflation, the public debt-to-GDP ratio, the budget 
balance-to-GDP ratio, international reserves as a share of GDP, and measures of institutional 
development (government effectiveness and bureaucratic quality). There is a significant degree of 
dispersion across countries in terms of government bond yields and spreads as well as overall 
macroeconomic and institutional performance. It is essential to analyze the time-series properties 
of the data to avoid spurious results by conducting panel unit root tests (Granger and Newbold, 
1974). We check the stationarity of all variables by applying the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) procedure, 
                                                 
6 The ND-GAIN database, covering 184 countries over the period 1995–2017, is available at https://gain.nd.edu/. 
7 The ND-GAIN database refers to this series as “readiness” for climate change, which we use as a measure of 
resilience against climate change.  
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which is widely used in the empirical literature to conduct a panel unit root test.8 The results, 
available upon request, indicate that the variables used in the analysis are stationary after 
logarithmic transformation. Also, econometric problems may arise when dealing with time-series 
cross-sectional data are autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation or, groupwise 
heteroscedasticity. Using the Durbin–Watson statistics and the log-likelihood ratio test, we 
conclude that there is no significant first-order autocorrelation and presence of cross-sectional 
correlation in our dataset. 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
We empirically investigate the impact of climate change on sovereign bond yields and spreads vis-
à-vis the U.S. benchmark by applying different model specifications in the following baseline form: 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
 
in which the dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, denotes government bond spreads or yields in country i and 
time t and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is the lagged dependent variable included in the dynamic model later on. 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡 
and 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 are the composite measures of climate change vulnerability and resilience, respectively. 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a set of control variables including the level and growth rate of real GDP, consumer price 
inflation, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government budget balance as a share of GDP, international 
reserves as a share of GDP, and measures of institutional quality. The 𝜂𝑖 and 𝜇𝑡 coefficients denote 
the time-invariant country-specific effects and the time effects controlling for common shocks that 
may affect financial conditions across all countries in a given year, respectively. 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an 
idiosyncratic error term that satisfies the standard assumptions of zero mean and constant 
variance. To account for possible heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors are clustered at the 
country level. 
We begin the empirical analysis with the standard fixed effects model, which provides consistent 
and robust results. The model above is reduced-form and therefore does not allow making causal 
statements or even quantifying the clean effect of climate change on sovereign spreads. Adding 
covariates partly corrects for these biases, but endogeneity can still arise from other omitted 
variables (unobserved heterogeneity and selection effects), measurement errors in variables, and 
reverse causality (simultaneity). Because causality can run in both directions, some of the right-
hand-side regressors may be correlated with the error term. In view of potential endogeneity and 
                                                 
8 The advantage of panel data integration is threefold: firstly, enables to by-pass the difficulty related to short 
spanned time series; secondly, the tests are more powerful than the conventional ones; thirdly, cross-section 
information reduces the probability of a spurious regression (Barnerjee, 1999). 
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the persistence of bond spreads, however, we check the sensitivity of our baseline results by 
estimating the static model with the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator. We use lagged 
climate change indices as instruments, which are validated by the Kleibergen-Paap and Hansen 
statistics.9 Further, even though it is a very demanding estimator, especially with limited number 
of unbalanced observations, we use the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach 
developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approach to estimate the 
dynamic version of our model. The system GMM approach, on the other hand, involves 
constructing two sets of equations, one with first differences of the endogenous and pre-
determined variables instrumented by suitable lags of their own levels, and one with the levels of 
the endogenous and pre-determined variables instrumented with suitable lags of their own first 
differences. We apply the one-step version of the system GMM estimator to ensure the robustness 
of the results, as the standard errors from the two-step variant of the system GMM method are 
known to be downward biased in small samples. 
The use of all available lagged levels of the variables in the GMM estimation leads to a proliferation 
in the number of instruments, which reduces the efficiency of the estimator in finite samples, and 
potentially leads to over-fitting. A further issue is that the use of many instruments significantly 
weakens the Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions, and so the detection of over-
identification is hardest when it is most needed. Conversely, however, restricting the instrument 
set too much results in a loss of information that leads to imprecisely estimated coefficients. 
Estimation of such models, therefore, involves a delicate balance between maximizing the 
information extracted from the data on the one hand and guarding against over-identification on 
the other. To this end, we follow the strategy suggested by Roodman (2009) to deal with the 
problem of weak and excessively numerous instruments. We also validate the system GMM 
identification assumptions by applying a second-order serial correlation test for the residuals and 
the Hansen J-test for the overidentifying restrictions. The values reported for AR(1) and AR(2) in 
the respective Tables are the p-values for first- and second-order autocorrelated disturbances in 
the first-differenced equation. As expected, we find that there is high first-order autocorrelation, 
but no evidence for significant second-order autocorrelation. Similarly, the Hansen J-test result 
indicate the validity of internal instruments used in the dynamic model estimated via the system 
GMM approach. 
As a baseline, we estimate Equation (1) using the standard fixed effects model and start with a 
specification including only macroeconomic and institutional variables in column (1) of Table 1 as 
a point of reference. We then present parsimonious specifications with only climate change 
vulnerability and resilience as explanatory variables in columns (2) and (3) individually and column 
(4) together and introduce the control variables into the regression in columns (5), (6) and (7). 
While these results demonstrate a consistent picture, we consider the model in column (7) with 
climate change vulnerability and resilience indicators and macroeconomic variables as our 
                                                 
9 Looking at the diagnostic statistics to assess the validity of the instrumental variable strategy, the 
underidentification test p-values generally reject the null that the different equations are underidentified. Also, 
the Hansen test statistics reveal that the instrument sets contain valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the 
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). 
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benchmark specification. Vulnerability to climate change has a statistically and economically 
significant effect on long-term (10-year) government bond spreads relative to the US benchmark 
in our sample of countries during the period 1995–2017. The coefficient on climate change 
vulnerability ranges between 0.579 and 2.526 depending on the model specification, but always 
remaining positive and statistically significant. This means that greater vulnerability to climate 
change is associated with higher cost of government borrowing. According to our benchmark 
specification, a one percentage point increase in climate change vulnerability is associated with an 
increase of 0.58 percent in long-term government bond spreads.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
We also find that investing in adaptation and mitigation helps improve climate change resilience 
and, thereby, lowers government bond spreads in our sample of countries during the period 1995–
2017. The coefficient on climate change resilience ranges between -0.164 and -0.405 depending 
on the model specification, but always remaining negative and statistically significant. In other 
words, countries that are more resilient to climate change have lower bond yields and spreads 
relative to countries with greater vulnerability to risks associated with climate change. According 
to our benchmark specification, 1 percent improvement in climate change resilience is associated 
with a decrease of 0.15 percent in long-term government bond spreads. These effects of climate 
change vulnerability and resilience remain robust when we introduce control variables for solvency 
(real GDP growth, budget balance and debt), liquidity (international reserves) and economic 
stability (inflation), for which we obtain coefficients that are as expected and broadly comparable 
to the findings in previous studies.  
When the sample is partitioned into country groups, we observe a substantial contrast between 
advanced and developing countries, as presented in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Both climate change vulnerability and resilience have no pronounced impact on government bond 
spreads in advanced economies, while the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients are much greater in the case of developing countries. According to our benchmark 
specification controlling for conventional macroeconomic factors, 1 percent increase in climate 
change vulnerability leads to an increase of 3.11 percent in long-term government bond spreads 
of emerging market economies, while 1 percent improvement in climate change resilience lowers 
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bond spreads by 0.75 percent. With long-term government bond spreads in our sample of 
developing countries averaging about 500 basis points, these estimated coefficients imply that a 
one percentage point increase in climate change vulnerability (or resilience) would increase (or 
decrease) sovereign debt risk premia by 15.55 basis points (or 3.75 basis points). These may seem 
small, but the difference between countries in the 25th and 75th quintile amounts to 233 basis 
points for climate change vulnerability and 56 basis points for climate change resilience. 
We perform several sensitivity checks to validate the robustness of our baseline empirical results. 
First, we replace government bond spreads with 10-year bond yields for a sample of 53 advanced 
and developing countries and with EMBIG spreads for a group of 44 developing countries as 
alternative measures of sovereign risk. These results, presented in Table 3, are broadly in line with 
the baseline findings and confirm that the impact of climate change is significant, especially among 
emerging market economies and developing countries.  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Second, we truncate the sample at the 5th and 95th percentiles to exclude potential outliers and 
obtain similar results, as presented in Table 4. We also considered Yohai (1987) Method of 
Moments approach to account for outliers that fits an efficient high breakdown estimator.10 Results 
(available upon request) confirm that outliers do not play a big role in our setting. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Third, we deal with potential endogeneity by estimating the model using the 2SLS estimator with 
lagged climate change indices as instruments. These results, presented in Table 5, confirm that 
climate vulnerability has a detrimental effect on the cost of borrowing, while climate resilience 
helps lower sovereign risk.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
                                                 
10 In the first stage it takes the S estimator, a high breakdown value method introduced in Rousseeuw and Yohai 
(1984) applied to the residual scale. It then derives starting values for the coefficient vectors, and on the second 
stage applies the Huber-type bi-square M-estimator using iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRWLS) to obtain 
the final coefficient estimates. 
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Finally, taking into consideration the potential persistence of bond spreads, we estimate a dynamic 
specification of the model using the system GMM approach and obtain a set of results, presented 
in Table 6, that are broadly consistent with our baseline findings. The only difference with respect 
to previous results relates to the coefficient on climate change resilience which now does not 
appear to be statistically significant. It should be noted that the system GMM is a very demanding 
estimator, especially with limited number of unbalanced observations, as it is the case with our 
panel dataset.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyzed the effects of climate change on sovereign risk as measured by 
government bond yields and spreads in 98 countries during the period 1995–2017. The results 
show that climate vulnerability has a highly significant effect on the cost of government borrowing, 
even after controlling for conventional macroeconomic and institutional determinants of sovereign 
risk. That is, countries with greater vulnerability to climate change pay a higher interest rate on 
government bonds. We also find that climate resilience has a similarly significant negative impact 
on the cost of borrowing. That is, countries that are more resilient to climate change have lower 
bond yields and spreads relative to countries with greater vulnerability to climate change. 
Furthermore, partitioning the sample into country groups reveals that the magnitude and statistical 
significance of these effects are much greater in developing countries with weaker capacity to 
adapt to and mitigate the consequences of climate change. These findings remain robust to a 
battery of sensitivity checks, including alternative measures of government bond spreads and 
yields, specifications and estimation methodologies.  
Econometric evidence presented in this paper has clear policy implications, especially for 
developing countries that are relatively more vulnerable to risks associated with climate change. 
Although climate change is inevitable, the negative coefficient on climate resilience shows that 
enhancing structural resilience through mitigation and adaptation, strengthening financial 
resilience through fiscal buffers and insurance schemes, and improving economic diversification 
and policy management can help cope with the consequences of climate change for public 
finances in particular and economic development in general.  
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Figure 1. Weather Anomalies Across the World 
 
 
 
Source: NOAA. 
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Figure 2. Climate Change and Government Bond Spreads 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ND-GAIN; Bloomberg; authors' calculations. 
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Table 1. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—Baseline Estimations 
  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent Variable Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads
Climate vulnerability 2.526*** 2.301*** 0.661** 0.579**
(0.765) (0.694) (0.296) (0.347)
Climate resilience -0.405*** -0.296** -0.164*** -0.151**
(0.144) (0.115) (0.063) (0.060)
Real GDP 0.906 2.722* 1.189 2.756*
(1.236) (1.553) (1.225) (1.566)
Real GDP growth -0.171** -0.183*** -0.192*** -0.200***
(0.071) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
Inflation 0.365*** 0.357*** 0.358*** 0.352***
(0.129) (0.127) (0.127) (0.125)
Debt 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.01) (0.01)
Budget balance 0.075* 0.093 0.082 0.097
(0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
International reserves -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Government effectiveness -1.619** -1.363* -1.093* -0.910*
(0.741) (0.725) (0.687) (0.690)
Bureaucratic quality -0.366 -0.486* -0.148* -0.271*
(0.716) (0.724) (0.721) (0.724)
Number of countries 53 54 54 54 53 53 53
Number of observations 823 995 995 995 823 823 823
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.72 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.72 0.72 0.72
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1
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Table 2. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—Country Groups 
 
 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads
Country Group Advanced Advanced Advanced Developing Developing Developing
Climate vulnerability 0.063 0.069 2.516*** 3.105***
(0.181) (0.173) (0.937) (0.913)
Climate resilience -0.006 -0.008 -0.612*** -0.750***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.175) (0.185)
Real GDP -1.409 -1.366 -1.440 15.170*** 8.488*** 17.660***
(1.368) (1.369) (1.387) (3.834) (2.515) (3.701)
Real GDP growth -0.289*** -0.291*** -0.290*** 0.078 0.005 0.015
(0.068) (0.069) (0.07) (0.128) (0.118) (0.114)
Inflation 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.333*** 0.349*** 0.324***
(0.054) (0.058) (0.058) (0.124) (0.126) (0.112)
Debt 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.146*** 0.133*** 0.153***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.04) (0.044)
Budget balance 0.054 0.056 0.054 0.098 0.022 0.117
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.131) (0.137) (0.122)
International reserves 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.266** -0.153** -0.180**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.104) (0.105) (0.096)
Government effectiveness -0.251 -0.217 -0.236 -0.979** -1.070** -1.337**
(0.54) (0.501) (0.501) (1.873) (2.068) (2.153)
Bureaucratic quality -0.807* -0.807* -0.797* -2.170* -1.907* -2.002*
(0.474) (0.495) (0.489) (2.091) (1.906) (1.769)
Number of countries 32 32 32 21 21 21
Number of observations 532 532 532 291 291 291
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.72 0.74
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—Alternative Measures 
  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Bond yields Bond yields Bond yields EMBIG spread EMBIG spread EMBIG spread
Country Group All All All Developing Developing Developing
Climate vulnerability 0.661* 0.579* 2.730*** 3.150***
(0.360) (0.347) (0.950) (0.961)
Climate resilience -0.164*** -0.151** -0.610*** -0.740***
(0.063) (0.060) (0.160) (0.175)
Real GDP 2.722* 1.189 2.756* 17.100** 10.485** 19.650**
(1.553) (1.225) (1.566) (0.309) (0.282) (0.327)
Real GDP growth -0.183*** -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.07) (0.069) (0.069) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Inflation 0.357*** 0.358*** 0.352*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.127) (0.127) (0.125) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Debt 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Budget balance 0.093 0.082 0.097 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
International reserves -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.066** -0.015** -0.017**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Government effectiveness -1.363* -1.093 -0.910 -0.671*** -0.649*** -0.642***
(0.725) (0.687) (0.69) (0.128) (0.141) (0.143)
Bureaucratic quality -0.486 -0.148 -0.271 -0.376** -0.368** -0.351**
(0.724) (0.721) (0.724) (0.172) (0.182) (0.181)
Number of countries 53 53 53 44 44 44
Number of observations 823 823 823 518 518 518
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.83
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—Excluding Outliers 
 
  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads
Climate vulnerability 2.844*** 2.949*** 0.751** 0.885**
(0.85) (0.837) (0.428) (0.472)
Climate resilience -0.546*** -0.530*** -0.203*** -0.223***
(0.183) (0.183) (0.072) (0.083)
Real GDP 3.684** 2.463* 5.595***
(1.764) (1.300) (2.084)
Real GDP growth -0.190** -0.213*** -0.227***
(0.074) (0.073) (0.075)
Inflation 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.342***
(0.128) (0.129) (0.125)
Debt 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.081***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
Budget balance 0.092 0.066 0.080
(0.05) (0.054) (0.058)
International reserves -0.038* -0.007 -0.041*
(0.023) (0.015) (0.024)
Government effectiveness -1.689** -1.491* -1.634*
(0.801) (0.797) (0.863)
Bureaucratic quality -0.719 -0.472 -0.722
(0.872) (0.871) (0.979)
Number of observations 804 817 687 671 686 587
% excluded 19% 18% 31% 18% 17% 29%
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.71 0.72 0.72
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—2SLS Estimations 
 
  
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads
Climate vulnerability 3.024*** 2.727*** 0.806*** 0.686***
(0.894) (0.815) (0.429) (0.41)
Climate resilience -0.438*** -0.302** -0.171*** -0.161***
(0.150) (0.122) (0.06) (0.058)
Real GDP 3.6495** 1.774* 3.6331**
(1.725) (1.265) (1.722)
Real GDP growth -0.192*** -0.200*** -0.210***
(0.067) (0.066) (0.066)
Inflation 0.352*** 0.354*** 0.347***
(0.121) (0.121) (0.119)
Debt 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064***
(0.011) (0.01) (0.011)
Budget balance 0.090 0.085 0.102
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
International reserves -0.005 -0.007 -0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Government effectiveness -1.598** -1.265** -1.082**
(0.723) (0.684) (0.686)
Bureaucratic quality -0.181 0.172 0.049
(0.715) (0.716) (0.717)
Number of countries 54 54 54 53 53 53
Number of observations 938 938 938 801 801 801
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap statistic (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen statistic (p-value) 0.17 0.03 0.10 0.62 0.47 0.78
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.72 0.73 0.73
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. The null hypothesis of 
the Kleibergen-Paap test is that the structural equation is underidentified (i.e., the rank condition fails) and tests that the excluded instruments are 
"relevant". Stock-Yogo critical values were applied. The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Climate Change and Sovereign Risk—Dynamic Estimations 
 
 
 
 
 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Bond spreads Bond spreads Bond spreads EMBIG EMBIG EMBIG 
Country Group All All All Developing Developing Developing
Estimator S-GMM S-GMM S-GMM S-GMM S-GMM S-GMM
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.6049*** 0.6134*** 0.6063*** 0.6350*** 0.5032*** 0.5130***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.067) (0.095) (0.093)
Vulnerability 0.1840*** 0.1945*** 0.1324* 0.1635**
(0.059) (0.045) (0.080) (0.077)
Resilience 0.0063 0.0052 -0.0072 0.0598
(0.071) (0.039) (0.078) (0.060)
Real GDP -0.1001 -0.1033 -0.1615 -0.1337 0.0982 -0.0090
(0.231) (0.220) (0.154) (0.160) (0.213) (0.164)
Real GDP growth -0.1812** -0.0507 -0.1075 -0.4032*** -0.5515*** -0.4139***
(0.073) (0.080) (0.081) (0.127) (0.126) (0.087)
Inflation 0.1372** 0.1246 0.1213** -0.0183 -0.0082 0.0118
(0.069) (0.082) (0.059) (0.036) (0.031) (0.028)
Debt -0.0099 -0.0050 -0.0077 0.0565 0.1383* 0.1066*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.051) (0.071) (0.063)
Budget balance -0.1149 -0.2420 -0.1268 -0.2363 -0.0873 0.0185
(0.115) (0.181) (0.117) (0.181) (0.139) (0.129)
International reserves 0.0090 -0.0113 0.0088 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.082) (0.099) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government effectiveness -2.4385 -1.7067 -1.9778 -1.9058 -2.6397 -2.3126
(0.804) (1.787) (1.051) (1.068) (1.884) (1.214)
Bureaucratic quality -2.4316** -2.2399* -1.8838** -2.6051** -5.4923*** -5.4290***
(1.197) (1.198) (0.889) (1.094) (1.661) (1.933)
Number of countries 52 52 52 44 44 44
Number of observations 810 810 810 495 495 495
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR1 (p-value) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.083 0.024 0.063
AR2 (p-value) 0.399 0.380 0.442 0.297 0.394 0.466
Hansen statistic (p-value) 0.369 0.416 0.992 0.755 0.891 0.804
Note: Robust standard errors reported in brackets. A constant is included in each regression, but not shown in the table. The 
Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 test for first and second autocorrelation, respectively.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
